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1. Overview  
Since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq the governance structures that have formed have had a 
significant impact on development, as well as contributing to conflict. Corruption, the patronage 
system, lack of decentralisation, and the process of government formation (and resulting 
operation thereof) are key factors hindering development and contributing to conflict in Iraq. As 
the last government term (2014-2018) focused on defeating the Islamic State (IS)1 and 
reclaiming Iraqi territory, much focus on the next government will be on the expectation of it 
delivering reforms on the above-mentioned issues now that IS is territorially defeated. This rapid 
review synthesises data from academic, policy and NGO sources on how issues surrounding 
governance in Iraq can hinder development and contribute to conflict. It is important to note – as 
this report is related to governance – that this report has been written during the time of 
negotiations for government formation following the May 2018 national elections.2 Thus, some 
elements of governance may change, however, the basic issues in relation to governance and, 
development and conflict, remain obstacles for the next government to overcome. Although 
many of Iraqi governorates have ethnosectarian majorities – mainly: Kurds, Sunni Arab, Shiite 
Arab – issues in relation to governance, development and conflict remain fairly consistent across 
the country and thus this report largely refers to country-wide issues.  
Key findings are as follows: 
• Under former Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki ‘strongman’ politics and the 
centralisation of power was pursued to devastating affect. Due to the lack of independent 
institutions to act as a check on power, these policies/actions can return if a similar type 
of leader takes charge following the current government negotiations. 
• In Iraq governing coalitions are negotiated after the election, which leads to a delay in 
government formation, as well as a period of uncertainty that can result in increased 
violence.  
• The formation of the government also leads to disjointed policies that hinder 
development, as promises are made to different parties in exchange for support. At the 
same time, promises are often not fulfilled, which can contribute to conflict.  
• Government formation in Iraq also leads to ministerial fiefdoms where political parties are 
given ministries in exchange for support and they are run without the formation of clear 
government strategy and for the best interest of the political party, which thus hinders 
development. 
▪ There is often poor coordination between the centre and the provinces which acts as a 
serious disruptor to development and, in the post-IS dynamics, as a serious disruptor to 
reconstruction. 
                                                   
1 Although referred to as the Islamic State in this report, this term only came into being after a caliphate was 
declared on June 29, 2014, and it was formerly known, and is often still referred to, as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is also 
often referred to as Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym of its name and has negative connotations. 
2 Although Haider al-Abadi (2014-present) is still prime minister, his coalition won the third most seats in the May 
2018 elections, so it remains to be seen whether he can form the new government. In order to form a majority-
government a coalition of at least five parties will need to be formed, which may take some time to negotiate. 
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• Poor governance in Iraq has led to the developing of oil infrastructure, whilst non-oil 
infrastructure has been neglected, thus hindering development in sectors other than the 
oil industry.  
• Mismanagement of the oil sector has hindered development, as the government has 
failed to take advantage when oil prices are high to utilise these finances for wider 
development. Mismanagement also makes the government vulnerable to fluctuations of 
oil prices. 
• The dynamics of the political system (patronage and fiefdoms) has meant that political 
leaders have yet to undertake the politically unpopular task of trimming the grossly 
overstaffed public sector in order to free up money for investment.  
• Political reforms to develop the economy have been hindered by strong structural 
challenges from both formal and informal economies where individuals who benefit from 
the current economy use their significant influence to hinder reform. 
• Iraq’s poor (and burdensome for private businesses) regulatory environment hinders the 
development of the private sector and there has been little political action towards reform. 
• The lack of maintenance, management, investment, and regulation in water and 
agriculture have hindered development and seriously degraded necessary infrastructure, 
which is likely to have a long-term impact on sustainability.  
• The Iraqi government has consistently prevented governorates from gaining more 
autonomy, which causes conflict and hinders local developmental planning. 
• The militias that formed to fight IS are not fully under the government’s control and often 
act on party-based goals which has led to, and can still lead to, conflict. Due to their 
popularity and the political dynamics, demobilising or integrating them into the army may 
prove difficult, making them a continued issue in relation to conflict.  
• Corruption is a long-standing issue in Iraq that is a drain on resources and finances, yet 
governments have consistently failed to address the issue. Moreover the lack of 
independent institutions to target corruption has allowed political actors to influence the 
process. 
• The patronage system in Iraq has had a significant negative impact on development, as 
under qualified people are in key positions and the large public sector is a drain on 
finances. 
• There have been widespread protests in Iraq over issues such as corruption, 
decentralisation, bad governance, lack of public services, non-payment of government 
salaries, lack of investment in infrastructure, etc., yet these issues have not been 
adequately addressed. If the protestors’ calls are not addressed by the next government 
they could escalate violently as in other countries in the region. 
• The failure of successive governments to address the disputed territories in Iraq has led 
to conflict and there remains a further danger of conflict. Additionally, the unresolved 
status of the disputed territories has hindered the development of these areas, as they 
remain in limbo. 
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2. Central Government 
Government Formation and Control 
Under the premiership of Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014) a number of unconstitutional actions were 
taken as he attempted to centralise power under his control. Maliki eliminated political opponents 
through non-political means such as accusations and arrests and filled key positions with his 
allies. Additionally, he widened the remit of the premiership and placed many key institutions 
(such as the high court, election commission, central bank, etc.) under his control (Costantini, 
2018; Dodge, 2013). Maliki also made himself the head of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
State for National Security, Ministry of Interior, as well as becoming the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces. He also replaced military officials with people loyal to him. When protests 
ensued, Maliki sent in the military with catastrophic results and the loss of many lives. The 
actions of Maliki contributed to the rise of IS – as he followed sectarian politics that alienated 
Kurds and Sunnis – and led to over four years of conflict between the state and IS. The lack of 
independent institutions to check these powers and hold Maliki to account contributed to his 
ability to amalgamate power, which led to conflict (Costantini, 2018; Dodge, 2013, 2014; 
O'Driscoll, 2017). Although there has been much change in Iraq and an increase in civic identity 
(and non-sectarian politics), as institutions have still not been made independent these actions 
can be repeated in the future, if the wrong type of government is formed, and once again create 
ethnosectarian divides that lead to conflict (Mansour, 2018b).  
Another issue with the central government is the process of government formation, as governing 
coalitions are negotiated after the election. Historically this has meant that government formation 
takes months and this period of uncertainty has also previously led to an increase in conflict. 
Additionally, negotiations for government have led to promises on policies in exchange for 
backing, which has prevented the establishment, and following through, of clear policies for 
development. Moreover, this limits the ability of the PM to enact change, as it creates 
relationships based on grand compromises (Mansour, 2018b).  
A further issue with the current government formation process is that promises are made in 
exchange for support, but when these promises are not kept, they either lead to or exacerbate 
conflict. An example of this is the repeated promises of implementing Article 140 of the 
Constitution on the disputed territories in exchange for Kurdish backing for the government. 
Failure to follow through on this promise has exacerbated conflict in Kirkuk and has also led to 
violence. A final aspect of government formation is the creation of ministerial fiefdoms where 
political parties are given ministries in exchange for support and they are run without the 
formation of clear government strategy, which in turn hinders development (Mansour, 2018b; 
World Bank, 2017). Moreover, due to the patronage system, there is a lack of qualified staff in 
positions responsible for development across multiple sectors, and returnees with skills often find 
it difficult to utilise their talents in this regard due to difficulties of entering or influencing the 
system (Paasche, 2016).  
Finally, as argued Diamond and Berkuti (2017), there is a resistance to systemic change to 
enhance the provision of services or to address the populations’ needs within the ministries in the 
central government, as maintaining complete control of the ministries is their key objective. There 
is often poor coordination between the centre and the provinces which acts as a serious disruptor 
to development and, in the post-IS dynamics, as a serious disruptor to reconstruction. The 
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success of developmental projects often require federal and local authorities to work together 
effectively at all stages of the process (Mansour, 2018b). 
Oil Sector 
Iraq has been plagued by poor governance and the mismanagement of resources and a lack of 
focus on, or understanding of, the needs of the population (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017). Iraq has 
focused on developing its oil infrastructure and has neglected its non-oil infrastructure, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Public Investment as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017, p. 53. 
At the same time, when the price of oil was high, Iraq failed to invest adequately in development 
or in divesting the economy away from its focus on hydrocarbons (World Bank, 2017). Figure 2 
demonstrates just how dependent Iraq is on oil, as well as the political actors’ failure to diversify 
the economy. The World Bank (2017) argues that the current reliance on the oil sector is not 
sustainable and that Iraq needs to diversify its economy. Iraq has a large and rapidly growing 
population and the oil sector cannot finance it or provide enough jobs. Additionally, due to limited 
government effectiveness and policy uncertainty there is no incentive for private sector 
investment, and thus Iraq is unable to generate productive spillovers from oil sector growth or 
government spending (which is connected to revenue from oil). 
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Figure 2: OPEC members’ oil exports as a percentage of total exports 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017, p. 14. 
The oil sector also negatively influences government and development as Iraq’s oil wealth has 
reduced the need for taxation and weakened the accountability link between citizens and the 
state, which to a certain extent is connected to the patronage system, but also in the failure to 
diversify the economy. Due to there being a lack of an effective system for managing oil revenue, 
the government is only able to address sudden declines in oil prices after the fact, therefore in 
crisis mode. Thus, the volatility of oil prices has affected the entire economy, yet policies have 
not been put in place to reduce the impact of the change of oil prices and deal with the issue 
before the price drops (World Bank, 2017).  
Economy 
In terms of governance in order to enhance developmental prospects, the government needs to 
carry out the highly unpopular task of trimming the public sector in order to free up money for 
investment in both economy-diversifying projects, especially skills specialisation projects, and 
development (World Bank, 2017).3  
From an economic developmental perspective Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (2014-present) 
has long had plans to privatise Iraq’s electricity and banking sectors in order to make the state 
more competitive in the region. Additionally, PM Abadi has plans to support the emergence of 
small- to medium-size businesses operating in the fields of energy, oil services, manufacturing, 
construction and consumer goods. However, the earlier-discussed clientelism and patronage 
system is a significant obstacle to these plans. There are strong structural challenges from both 
formal and informal economies, which rely on these systems of clientelism and patronage. Thus, 
individuals who benefit from them use their significant influence to hinder these economic 
                                                   
3 See Figure 3 and 4 on page 10 for an understanding of the current cost of public sector employment 
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developments (Mansour, 2018b). Currently economic management in Iraq mainly focuses on 
short-term needs and the large spending programme largely ignores longer-term diversification. 
Moreover Iraq’s fiscal institutions have no coherent revenue management policies, which further 
inhibits the development of the economy. The World Bank (2017, p. 64) argues that poor 
governance in Iraq hinders the development of the economy: 
Good governance and strong, accountable, institutions are essential to restoring the legitimacy of 
the state and to reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. They create an enabling 
environment for sustained economic growth that helps to reduce poverty, they allow the effective 
implementation of social and distributive policies that promote social, economic, and human 
wellbeing and development, and they protect the population from economic and social exclusion, 
thereby boosting shared prosperity.  
Additionally Iraq’s poor regulatory environment hinders the development of the private sector. 
There are far too many regulations and they are often poorly designed or outdated, as old laws 
have not been repealed when new ones were created. Much of the Iraqi legislation works against 
the country’s need for an open, transparent, and diversified economy. Yet, the government lack 
policy for regulatory review and reform. Moreover, as there is a lack of coordination between 
ministries, laws are also poorly enforced (World Bank, 2017).  
Water and Agriculture 
Environmental neglect has degraded the potential of Iraq’s rivers and agricultural production. 
Moreover, upstream diversion of rivers by Iraq’s neighbours has further limited the potential. One 
of the main issues relating to governance is the short-term, rather than medium to long-term 
planning, which has resulted in polices that focus on crude oil production and essential imports. 
Additionally, government policies in the agricultural sector consist of state control and subsidies, 
which negatively impact the development of the sector. Whilst insufficient maintenance and 
funding have degraded agricultural services and infrastructure. The lack of maintenance, 
management, and regulation of the irrigation system has had a particularly negative impact, as 
much of the water is highly salient and has thus seriously damaged the soil and significantly 
reduced yields from crops. At a ministerial level there is little institutional coordination and 
cooperation in agricultural planning and project implementation, which has further deteriorated 
the overall system particularly with regards to institutional assistance. There is very little or weak 
agricultural monitoring systems, which in turn hinders the effective development of agricultural 
policies. The Ministry of Water Resources is also endangering Iraq’s future development through 
poor water management and it is estimated that Iraq may not have enough high quality fresh 
water to meet its developmental needs by as early as 2020 (World Bank, 2017, p. 96). Rapid 
population growth, poor systems, and waste is quickly reducing the gap between the demand 
and supply of water and will have a negative impact in the development in a range of sectors 
from oil and agriculture to manufacturing (World Bank, 2017).  
3. Militias 
The governance system in Iraq allows for ministries to become miniature fiefdoms with political 
parties taking control of them and utilising them for their own interests. As coalitions are formed 
after the election, the prime minister needs these parties on board to maintain the government, 
thus giving them a lot of leeway to push their own agenda. In this respect the militias that formed 
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or reformed to fight against IS have never really been under the full control of the PM. Wider 
control is not in the PM’s hands, but also within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)4 many of 
the different groups form party militias. Due to these dynamics, as well as the popularity of the 
PMF following the defeat of IS, demobilising or integrating the PMF within the Iraqi army proves a 
difficult task. The divided and individualised nature of the PMF means that it is more likely to 
engage in violent conflict. For instance, there are a range pre-existing conflicts across Iraq, 
particularly in Nineveh, and now the groups involved in these conflicts control armed militias. The 
lack of governmental control over the PMF also means that there is a higher chance in them 
engaging in skirmishes with the Kurds in areas like Kirkuk, and there have already been threats 
of violence from individual militia members. At the wider level, the PMF forces have taken control 
of borders and gone to fight in Syria, despite the PM forbidding it (Mansour & ʻAbd al-Jabbār, 
2017; O'Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017).  
The PMF also compete with the central government and Iraqi Security Forces for capacity and 
resources. Due to their importance in the fight against IS, their popularity amongst the 
population, and the high position of some of the leaders within the central government, the PMF 
is able to exert considerable influence and pressure on the decision-making process within Iraq. 
Thus, the PMF leadership was able to insist on additional funds from PM Abadi and due to the 
above-mentioned dynamics the PM had to agree and the PMF now receive between USD 1-1.5 
billion per a year. Additionally the money is managed by the groups within the PMF and the 
senior leadership has complete control of the spending, thus giving little oversight by the 
government leading to a lack of accountability and transparency over finances (Mansour, 2018a). 
Mansour (2018a) argues that if the PMF-linked political parties manage to form the government 
in the current government-formation process then the militias gain further institutionalisation and 
will directly take part in state re-building. However, if Abadi or Muqtada al-Sadr (whose coalition 
won the most seats in the 2018 elections) manage to form the next government the PMF and its 
allies will act as opposition, which will allow them to exert pressure on the new PM and could 
also lead to conflict.  
4. Lack of decentralisation 
Article 119 of the Iraqi constitution allows for the formation of new federal regions through a 
referendum in the province/s if requested by either one-third of the council members of each 
governorate intending to form a region, or by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates 
intending to form a region.5 Whilst Law 21, which was passed in 2008 and revised in 2013 allows 
for the devolution of significant powers to the governorates (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017). 
However, decentralisation and further autonomy in Iraq has been constantly denied. Many 
governorates – including Anbar, Basra, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah al-Din – have talked 
of or attempted to gain more autonomy, as is their constitutional right, but have been denied by 
the government. The former PM, Nouri al-Maliki, outright denied or blocked any thoughts of 
devolution of power. Many of the governorates that attempted to gain further autonomy during 
Maliki’s premiership were taken over by IS, highlighting how the refusal to engage with 
                                                   
4 The PMF, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organisation composed of a 
number of militias. Although predominantly Shiite, there are also Sunni, Christian, Shabak, Yazidi, Turkmen, etc. 
militias. 
5 https://iraqmission.us/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/iraqi_constitution.pdf  
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decentralisation can lead to conflict (Dodge, 2013; Isakhan & Mulherin, 2018; O'Driscoll, 2017; 
Romano, 2014). During PM Abadi’s term (2014-present) the focus was on defeating IS and 
gaining back lost territory, thus although decentralisation was one of his early promises, this did 
not materialise. However, the issues surrounding decentralisation have not gone away, and 
governorates want the chance to develop and invest in their territory. Although Iraq has changed 
significantly since 2014, the issue of decentralisation has not gone away and remains a 
significant challenge for the Iraqi central government. Without a viable solution conflict could 
return, as argued by Isakhan and Mulherin (2018, p. 278): 
The future status of the regions freed from ISIS control and Kurdish claims over territories retaken 
by Iraqi forces in late 2017 certainly loom as significant challenges for Iraq’s political elite and for 
the integrity of the state as a whole. The potential for further conflict, renewed calls for 
decentralization, and outright secession remains very real.  
It is important to note that calls for decentralisation in Iraq are not for the ethnosectarian division 
of Iraq, but rather from territories that feel they have been ignored, particularly from a 
developmental perspective, or feel that the central government is failing to deliver on key 
economic and developmental goals. Basra is a good example of a governorate seeking 
autonomy based on these principles. Although thus far Basra’s calls have remained peaceful, 
threats from Basra politicians that they would take control of oil fields and bypass Baghdad’s 
control, means conflict, as witnessed with the Kurds in Kirkuk, is a possibility. This does not 
necessarily mean that Baghdad needs to grant a number of governorates a federal region status, 
but real discussions on decentralisation and addressing the issues within these governorates are 
needed (Isakhan & Mulherin, 2018). 
There is also the argument that the current form of Law 21 would not be suitable for a number of 
governorates that include minorities, as it allows for most decisions to be made through absolute 
majority. Absolute majority, as defined in the 2013 Amendment of the law, means 50% + 1 vote. 
In the current political climate in Iraq, and particularly in provinces with many minorities, this 
would lead to minorities being marginalised in the local-level decision-making process. This in 
turn could lead to conflict, particularly as many of these minorities now have their own militias 
within the framework of the PMF (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017).  
5. Corruption 
Transparency International rates Iraq as the 11th most corrupt country out of 180 in their 2017 
Corruption Perceptions Index.6 Abbas and Ismail (2017, p. 2192) argue that ‘corruption acts as a 
main impediment to growth, development and prosperity’ in Iraq. As a result of corruption there 
are unfinished roads, schools, hospitals, etc. (Aziz, 2017). Mansour (2018b, p. 12) argues that: 
In a sense, Shia, Kurdish, Sunni and other elites all benefitted from both Iraq’s oil wealth and 
American cash intended to help rebuilding efforts after the invasion. This wealth has not trickled 
down to Iraq’s citizens, leading to a crisis of governance that can explain collapses.  
However, despite this, very little has been done to adequately tackle corruption in the country. In 
a country in need of significant investment in development considering the destruction as a result 
of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and later the war against IS, corruption has had a 
considerable negative impact on development within the country. For instance, the costs of 
                                                   
6 https://www.transparency.org/country/IRQ  
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development projects were often grossly exaggerated so elites and their cronies could profit from 
them and sometimes they were not even carried out (Abbas and Ismail, 2017). At a more local 
level, projects were often given to cronies who subcontracted them out, who then often also 
subcontracted them out, and so on – leading to very poor quality projects if even completed 
(O'Driscoll, 2016). Abbas and Ismail (2017) argue that an additional issue with corruption in Iraq 
was that it has a negative impact on foreign investment, which hinders development and growth. 
Clientelism has also hindered development for a number of reasons. In Iraq, including the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), public appointments are often connected to political parties and 
patronage networks. Another aspect of clientelism is ‘Ghost’ employees who are either people 
who are hired, but don’t turn up to work, or people who don’t actually exist and their salaries are 
taken by other officials. Additionally, there are a number of people receiving pensions who should 
not be and there are also more people receiving pensions at the top scale than have ever worked 
at this scale. Clientelism in Iraq impacts development in a number ways; firstly, it results in the 
hiring of people who are not qualified for the job and in ministries connected to development this 
is a significant obstacle to progress. Secondly, this leads to an extremely large civil service, 
which is a drain on funds that could be used for developmental projects. It is suggested that over 
70% of the budget is spent on operational aspects, leaving only 30% for investment (Abdullah, 
Gray, & Clough, 2018, p. 674). Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate the sheer scale of the public sector in 
Iraq and the drain that these salaries place in the budget.  
Figure 3: Increase in public sector costs  Figure 4: MENA public sector salaries 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017, p. 52.    Source: World Bank, 2017, p. 52. 
 
Finally, clientelism in Iraq undermines accountability, as due to positions in the civic service 
being given in exchange for votes, politicians do not need to deliver on aspects connected to the 
development of Iraq in order to get re-elected. Abdullah et al. (2018, p. 680) sum up the impact of 
clientelism in Iraq as: ‘instead of voters holding their representatives to account, clientelism 
makes voters accountable to their representatives’. Whilst Mansour (2018b, p. 25) summarises it 
thusly: 
The ease of receiving cash leads to expansive and bloated bureaucracies rather than cost-
effective and accountable governance. Linked to corruption, the rentier state’s resources are sent 
to ministries, divided by the elite, and do not trickle down to the population.  
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Corruption has also contributed to conflict in Iraq, as it has previously resulted in the military 
being poorly supplied, due to missing funds, and the numbers of troops being exaggerated due 
to ghost troops. The non-payment of salaries or poor conditions due to lack of resources, has led 
to poor morale and forces selling their equipment. These dynamics are partly responsible for the 
Iraqi army’s capitulation against relatively few IS members in the summer of 2014, which resulted 
in the largest conflict on Iraqi soil since the US-led invasion in 2003.  Although the threat of IS led 
to significant investment in the various armed forces in Iraq by the international community and 
the Iraqi government, as this threat diminishes there is a danger that corruption could once again 
degrade the military and thus make conflict more likely (Dodge, 2014).  
The bodies to fight corruption in Iraq are not independent, and efforts to tackle corruption are 
often very weak. Members of the government influence these bodies and prevent real tackling of 
corruption within the government. Those charged with corruption are often targeted for political 
reasons, rather than corruption (Abbas and Ismail, 2017). Reforms on corruption that were 
promised by PM Abadi, and approved by parliament, have yet to be implemented. The lack of 
independence of the judiciary has meant that it has remained politicised and has thus been 
unwilling to reform. This has resulted in decisions, such as the removal of the office of vice 
presidency, being overturned. Additionally, charges of corruption are not brought against allies 
despite there being evidence of corruption. Instead, those in positions supposed to be used to 
tackle corruption, use anti-corruption measures as a political tool to target opponents (Mansour, 
2018b).7  
6. Political change/protest 
Linked to a number of the issues discussed above is the protest movement in Iraq calling for 
political change. Protests have covered issues such as corruption, decentralisation, bad 
governance, lack of public services, non-payment of government salaries, lack of investment in 
infrastructure, etc. and have emerged across the country. These protests are demand-driven, 
rather than ethnosectarian in nature. Despite PM Abadi forming a detailed reform plan to address 
the concerns of the protestors, few inroads have been made. Protests in Iraq have often been 
met with disproportionate violence, particularly during Maliki’s premiership and protesters 
themselves have also turned violent (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2015; Yahya, 
2017). More recently in the KRI, protestors and journalists were arrested and detained and there 
was widespread accusations of torture and abuse. Additionally, journalist and protestors claimed 
their footage of the protests was deleted by the Kurdish security forces (Human Rights Watch, 
2018). As protests have routinely led to violence in Iraq and are connected to poor governance, if 
the issues are not addressed they could escalate violently as in other countries in the region 
(Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2015; Yahya, 2017). 
 
                                                   
7 For Instance a group aligned with former PM Maliki, which included MPs such as the head of the corruption 
committee Haitham al-Jabouri, targeted Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari and Sunni Arab Defence 
Minister Khalid al-Obeidi and made them lose their positions, whilst others with evidence of corruption against 
them remain unscathed. 
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7. Disputed territories 
The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their borders changed by the previous 
regime and now involve disputes over the ownership of these areas. They involve Kirkuk, Diyala, 
Nineveh, Salah al-Din and the provinces of the KRI (O'Driscoll, 2016). Although there are 
mechanisms to deal with the issue of the disputed territories – Article 58 of Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) called for the normalisation of the disputed territories of Iraq, followed 
by a census and then a referendum on the future constitutional status (in Kirkuk’s case whether it 
would join the KRI or not), whilst Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation 
of Article 58 of the TAL by the 31st December 2007 – no government has implemented them and 
the deadline for Article 140 has long passed (O’Driscoll, 2018). There have been many 
complaints from communities within the disputed territories – particularly in Nineveh – that the 
unresolved status hinders development. They argue that due to the administrative boundaries 
having not been decided, neither the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) nor Baghdad want 
to invest in the areas development for fear of losing the territory to the other. Thus, the undecided 
status of these territories, and the failure of successive governments to reach a resolution, has 
prevented the necessary investment for development projects, which is particularly relevant as 
these are significantly undeveloped areas that have also been negatively impacted by the war 
against IS. Residents of Kirkuk have complained that despite the significant oil wells, due to the 
competition for ownership there has been no investment in areas that would allow the population 
to benefit from the oil, such as a refinery (see: O'Driscoll, 2016; van Zoonen & Wirya, 2017a; van 
Zoonen & Wirya, 2017b, 2017c).  
Competition between rival ethnosectarian nationalisms within the disputed territories for 
ownership and control has already led to conflict, and is likely to continue to do so, as the issue 
of remains unresolved. For instance there have been skirmishes between rival militias in Sinjar 
over control of territory, and as there is a vast number of ethnosectarian-based militias within 
Nineveh competition for territory can easily turn violent (Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016; Kaválek, 
2017; O'Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). Additionally, competition between Kurds and Baghdad 
over ownership of Kirkuk has led to armed conflict between the Kurds on the one side and the 
Iraqi army and the PMF on the other. Although Baghdad has taken control of the area, the issue 
over ownership remains and the conflict has not been resolved and can therefore turn violent 
once again (O’Driscoll, 2018). The competition over governance and the lack of cooperation 
between the Kurds and Baghdad has also led to a deterioration of the security in Kirkuk and has 
allowed remnants of IS to carry out attacks (Oxford Analytica, 2018). 
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